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Abstract 
 
This  paper  reports  the  results  of  a  nationally  representative  survey  that  assessed 
individual and household willingness to pay extra taxes for increased levels of social 
transfers in Ireland. Different respondents interpret willingness-to-pay questions as 
referring to individual or household budgets. This paper demonstrates that the most 
important variable explaining this is financial integration within the household and we 
argue  that  this  is  a  potentially  crucial  source  of  differential  item  functioning  in 
willingness-to-pay studies. Furthermore, individuals take intra-household bargaining 
considerations in to account when forming preferences for policies.  Specifically, we 
find that gender differences emerge significantly for a specific fiscal policy when the 
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1. Introduction 
 
Standard  economic  models  of  voter  preferences  assume  that  only  those  who  gain 
monetarily  either  directly  or  indirectly  (e.g.  via  children)  from  different  welfare 
schemes will support re-distributive policies, although the literature across various 
disciplines has also incorporated more flexible functional forms on utility with respect 
to the consumption and/or utility of others (e.g. Fong 2001, Hochman and Rogers 
1969). This paper analyses an issue that has not been assessed in the literature on 
public preferences for social welfare, and one that has wider relevance to the literature 
on willingness to pay (WTP) for non-marketed goods - the uncertainties associated 
with disentangling individual preferences from household preferences. This issue is 
very important as the vast majority of current papers on preferences for inequality 
have been conducted on large international data sets that analyse general attitudes to 
redistribution rather than WTP and preferences for specific policies of redistribution 
and social transfers (e.g. Scheve and Slaughter 2003). Once we consider WTP for 
specific proposals, we need to develop a more contextualised model of the manner in 
which individuals, as parts of households, make choices, particularly if the goal of the 
analysis is to construct aggregated measures of valuation to be used in cost-benefit 
analysis. 
 
The first task of this paper is, in the context of the literature on contingent valuation 
methodology  (CVM)  and  building  on  work  in  Delaney  and  O’Toole  (2004),  to 
explore the issue of eliciting preferences from individuals, bearing in mind that most 
individuals are only part of a household. In this context, the empirical modelling of 
household preferences is also analysed. The second task of this paper is to explore the   4
influence  of  gender,  taking  into  account  various  possible  household  financial 
management systems. Tests of the pooled income hypothesis have consistently shown 
that differences in income between husbands and wives have significant effects on the 
allocation  of  income  across  different  expenditure  items  and,  in  particular,  on 
household-related outcomes such as child health. Following Lampietti (1999), this 
paper addresses whether or not husbands and wives’ preferences are the same for 
general transfer policies and whether gender and intra-household financial allocation 
systems influence preferences over non-marketed government activity. Specifically, 
this paper tests whether or not wives from high income households are more opposed 
than husbands from high-income households to a set of policies that would make 
child benefit, a transfer generally made to the mother, more progressive in household 
income (e.g. taxable). 
 
The  rest  of  this  paper  is  structured  as  follows.    Section  2  reviews  the  existing 
literature. Section 3 describes the structure and administration of a nationwide survey 
designed by the authors to examine preferences for redistribution. Section 4 provides 
the results and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Households and Individual Willingness to Pay for Social Transfers  
 
2.1. Individual Willingness to Pay: Respondents’ Self-Perceived Agency 
There  are  several  methods  of  eliciting  household  WTP,  and  a  full  taxonomy  of 
different elicitation methods would involve interacting the traditional taxonomy with 
permutations  of  the  different  manners  (e.g.  order)  in  which  the  members  of  a 
household could conceivably be interviewed. Delaney and O’Toole (2004) analysed   5
the  issue  of  eliciting  household  and  personal  willingness  to  pay  from  individual 
respondents in  a standard  contingent  valuation setting. Following Quiggin (1998), 
Delaney and O’Toole argued that this issue had crucial significance for the contingent 
valuation literature and that many studies were rendered at least very imprecise by 
failing to adequately address the issue. The authors showed that respondents varied 
significantly  in  the  way  they  modelled  a  standard  WTP  question  with  some 
respondents choosing to give personal WTP and some respondents choosing to give 
household  WTP.  Furthermore,  the  authors  showed  that  this  decision  depended 
significantly  on  socio-demographic  characteristics  such  as  gender,  age  and  the 
presence of children. Thus, the authors argued, that as well as making it difficult to 
meaningfully aggregate the results of many willingness to pay studies, the issue of 
how respondents modelled their own agency also has implications for determining 
how the benefits of different non-marketed activities are distributed. 
 
In this paper, the concept of respondents’ self-perceived agency in valuation studies is 
further developed and empirically tested. The key issue is the extent to which the 
respondent to a WTP question views the relevant budget constraint as being his/her 
own  personal  share  of  the  household  budget  or  the  total  household  budget  (or 
something  in-between).  In  particular,  there  may  be  significant  heterogeneity  in 
perceived entitlement to “spend” from the household account. Two related questions 
are addressed in the context of the standard open-ended WTP question. 
 
1.  Do  individual  respondents  process  the  standard  open-ended  question,  “What  is 
your maximum WTP?” as being his/her own personal WTP from his/her own budget   6
constraint (however constructed or visualised) or as being his/her household WTP 
from the household budget? 
 
2.  Do  individual  respondents  process  the  open-ended  question,  “What  is  your 
maximum household WTP?” as being his/her own personal WTP or as being his/her 
household WTP? 
 
In effect, Delaney and O’Toole (2004) analysed how respondents modelled the first 
question,  in  which  the  agency  issue  is  left  open  to  the  respondent.  The  basic 
willingness to pay scenario, which centred on services provided by the Irish public 
service broadcaster (RTÉ) was presented as follows, 
 
Q.13 “Thinking of a situation where there was no licence fee and you had a 
choice  of  either  paying  to  receive  RTÉ’s  services  or  not  paying  and  not 
receiving RTÉ’s services. Bearing in mind that any money that you spend is 
money that you could spend on other goods and services, what would be the 
maximum amount of money you would be prepared to pay each month in 
order to receive RTÉ’s services? (Do not prompt)” 
 
If appropriate, the respondent was then asked the follow-up question(s). 
 
Q.14  (Only  ask  this  question  if  there  is  more  than  one  person  in  the 
respondent’s household) “Which of the following best describes your answer 
to Q.13? (Tick one) 
   7
￿ This is the most you personally would be willing to pay. (If yes, then ask 
Q.15) 
￿ This is the most your entire household would be willing to pay. (If yes, then 
skip Q.15, go to Q.16) 
 
Q.15 In light of your answer to Q.14, what do you think is the maximum 
amount of  money your household would be willing to pay each month to 
receive RTÉ’s services?" 
 
The aim of that analysis was to demonstrate the aggregation biases that result when 
respondents are left, to at least some extent, to model their own agency.
1 However, the 
aim of this paper is to demonstrate that even when the researcher explicitly frames the 
agency of the respondent, the respondent may not, for a variety of reasons, model the 
task set in the manner dictated by the question set-up. In particular, respondents might 
not  be  meaningfully  able  to  distinguish  between  his/her  own  personal  budget 
constraint and his/her household’s budget constraint.
2 
 
The determinants of how individual respondents model the standard WTP questions 
can  be  usefully  analyzed  by  estimating  conditional  distributions  on  demographic 
factors such as gender, age and occupation. In addition, the importance of financial 
integration within the household (e.g. Burgoyne 1995, Pahl 1995) is a measure that is 
explored in the empirical analysis. Respondents who are in a financially integrated 
relationship may be less likely to distinguish between his/her own “personal” WTP 
                                                 
1 The nature of the ambiguity seems particularly pronounced in the English language where “you” can 
be understood as being singular (i.e. individual) or plural (i.e. collective, e.g. household). 
2 For example, it would seem possible that individuals as part of households may suppress (from 
consciousness) income-sharing rules within the household for psychological or cultural reasons.   8
and  “household”  WTP,  whereas  those  in  a  relationship  that  is  not  financially 
integrated  may  be  more  likely  to  distinguish  more  between  “personal”  WTP  and 
“household” WTP. 
 
2.2. Intra-Household Factors and Preferences for Transfers  
As well as examining how respondents model questions as regards their personal and 
household  constraints,  we  also  examine  how  intra-household  factors  determine 
preferences  for  general,  and  specific,  transfers.  Lampietti  (1999)  uses  differences 
between  husbands  and  wives  in  WTP  for  malarial  prevention  to  test  the  “pooled 
income hypothesis”. Tests of the pooling hypothesis have consistently demonstrated a 
difference in the effect of income controlled by either husbands or wives on a number 
of different outcomes, such as child health and nutrition (Schultz 1990, Thomas 1990) 
and expenditure on alcohol and tobacco (Phipps and Burton, 1992, Hoddinott and 
Haddad  1995).  Co-operative  and  non-cooperative  bargaining  models  of  household 
behaviour and preferences offer alternatives to the pooled income hypothesis, and can 
also be employed to explore preferences for wide-scale government activity.
  
 
At a general level, several authors have assessed the concept of a “gender gap” in 
fiscal preferences with the evidence pointing against a marked gender differences.
3 
We argue here that examining such general preferences, while interesting, fails to 
disentangle from an economic perspective the reasons why one would expect gender 
differences. To do this, we argue, one needs to examine specific schemes and their 
implication for the distribution of entitlements within the household.
4 One particularly 
interesting test of the shared income hypothesis in the Irish context is preferences for 
                                                 
3 A number of recent papers have also examined gender differences in preferences for environmental 
goods (e.g. Dupont, 2004). 
4 In this regard, see Alvarez and McCaffrey (2003).   9
conditionality  of  child-benefit  payments.  Child-benefit  payments  in  Ireland  are 
universal and are generally paid to the mother. One of the chief arguments against 
making child–benefit conditional on income is that given that it is a payment to the 
mother, reducing it to any segment in society would have negative consequences for 
the mother in the intra-household allocation process.
5 The pooled income hypothesis, 
whereby households maximize a common-utility function, puts testable restrictions on 
parameters  describing  individual  preference  structures  on  our  survey  data.  If 
preference structures are formed in this type of world, then there is no reason to 
believe  that  men  and  women,  holding  income  constant,  would  have  different 
preferences for this proposal. It may be, of course, the case that men and women have 
different  preferences  for  other  reasons,  but  if  income  is  pooled  then  preferences 
should not be different at different levels of income. However, a model where degree 
of entitlement to income within a household determines intra-household allocations 
would  predict  an  interaction  between  income  and  support  for  conditionality.  
Specifically, women from higher income households being the group that would lose 
effective entitlement to income should be more opposed to the proposal that child-
benefit be made conditional on income than men from higher income households.  
 
3. Survey Design and Scenario 
 
3.1. Administration 
The  specific  questions  examined  in  this  paper  form  part  of  a  survey  eliciting 
preferences  for  social  welfare  in  Ireland.  The  nationally  representative  survey,  of 
                                                 
5  Proposals  to  tax  child  benefit  in  Ireland  are  met  with  considerable  opposition.  For  example,  in 
response to a 2002 proposal,  the National Women’s  Council of Ireland responded,  ”The National 
Women’s Council of Ireland (NWCI) is astonished and appalled that the Government is considering 
taxing Child Benefit …  We will not stand by and watch the Government scapegoat children and 
women”. (NWCI Press Release, Monday 16 September 2002)   10 
those aged 15+, was based on 1,159 face-to-face individual respondent interviews (in 
the respondents’ homes) carried out by Lansdowne Market Research in June 2004. 
There was quota controlling based on age, gender, place of residence and occupation; 
however, the characteristics of non-respondents  are  not available. The  interviewer 
implemented (randomly) the split-sample procedure (see below). The questionnaire 
used in the nationwide survey consisted of 25 questions.
6 The questions were ordered 
such that respondents were initially asked to consider general attitudes to government 
spending (on Social and Family Affairs, Health and Education) and taxation, and were 
then asked the WTP questions. More detailed questions on specific social welfare 
schemes  and,  in  particular,  child  benefit,  unemployment  assistance  and  old  age 
pensions, were then asked.  
 
3.2. Willingness to Pay Scenarios 
The WTP question has the disadvantage that it does not specify a precise vector of 
benefits deriving from the tax to be paid over. Pilot testing indicated that respondents 
interpreted  the  question  as  demanding  a  monetary  amount  to  achieve  necessary 
improvements  to  social  welfare  benefits.  Importantly,  informal  pilot-tests 
demonstrated  considerable  lack  of  clarity  among  respondents  as  to  whether  the 
amount they pay would come from their own budget or their household budget and 
that  differential  phrasing  of  the  initial  question  did  not  solve  this  problem.  After 
several clarifications, pilot-test respondents settled on a valuation that was frequently 
far different from the initial amount. The practicalities of the interview process in the 
nationwide sample precluded the use of detailed interview protocols necessary to fully 
explore all the interesting issues raised. 
                                                 
6 The questionnaire is available from the authors upon request.   11 
 
A 2x2 split-sampling procedure was employed. The scenario went as follows, with 
half of the respondents being asked Version A and half of the respondents being asked 
Version B: 
 
Version A: Q5a Would you be willing to pay more money in taxes each week in 
order to support extra social welfare spending on children, the disabled, pensioners, 
carers, the unemployed and those on low incomes? In other words, imagine that the 
government proposed increasing spending on these schemes and paying for these 
increases by increasing taxes on products and services and this were to cost you 
money. How much extra money, at a maximum, would you be willing to pay per 
week? 
 
Version B: Q5a Would your household be willing to pay more money in taxes each 
week in order to support extra social welfare spending on children, the disabled, 
pensioners,  carers,  the  unemployed  and  those  on  low  incomes?  In  other  words, 
imagine that the government proposed increasing spending on these schemes and 
paying for these increases by increasing taxes on products and services and this were 
to cost your household money. How much extra money, at a maximum, would your 
household be willing to pay per week? 
 
Both sets of respondents were then asked the follow-up question: 
 
Q5b Which of the following best represents your response to the above question?   12 
(i)  This is the total amount of extra money that my household would be 
willing to pay. 
(ii)  This is the total amount of extra money that I would be willing to pay. 
 
Respondents who answered (ii) to Q5b were asked the following question, 
 
Q5c How much money at a maximum would your household be willing to pay? 
 
Standard socio-demographic variables such as gender, age, income, and education 
were assessed. There was also included a question that asked respondents who were 




Q17  Which  of  the  following  statement  best  describes  how  you  and  your  partner 
conduct your financial affairs? 
 
(i)  We have completely separate finances that we rarely discuss. 
(ii)  We have separate accounts. 
(iii)  We have joint accounts. 
(iv)  We have joint accounts and conduct all our finances together. 
(v)  We have joint accounts but what we do with the rest of our money, we 
decide as individuals. 
                                                 
7  Pahl  (1995)  identifies  a  number of  different income  allocation strategies  among couples: female 
whole wage where the women controls the allocation of the total wage, male whole wage where the 
male “earns” the money and decides how it all should be allocated, housekeeping allowance where the 
husband gives the wife a fixed sum to manage housekeeping activities, income pooling, where there is 
complete or near-complete income sharing, and independent management systems where both partners 
have their own income and finances are conducted separately.   13 
 
3.3. Preferences for Government Spending and Attitudes towards Conditionality  
The questions analysed in this paper are general questions assessing the respondent’s 
preferences for taxation and government spending, and questions eliciting preferences 
for specific welfare schemes. For example, respondents were asked (Q3) about their 
general level of preferences for government activity and asked to choose between 
“More government spending and more taxes”, “Less Government Spending and Less 
Taxes” and “An unchanged amount of government spending and taxes”. Respondents 
were  also  asked  (Q2)  their  preferences,  on  a  seven-point  scale,  for  increased  or 
decreased expenditure on each of Social Welfare, Education and Health. In addition, 
respondents were asked (Q7) to choose their top priority for social welfare spending 
among  the  categories  of  pensions,  child  benefit,  benefits  for  unemployed  people, 
benefits for disabled people, benefits for single parents or none of the above.  
 
In order to explore the pooled income hypothesis, attitudes toward conditionality of 
child-benefit are explored in particular detail. Respondents were asked (Q10) to rate 
on a seven-point scale their level of agreement with a series of statements including: 
 
“Child benefit should only be paid to those who need it”; 
“Child  benefit  should  be  paid  to  everyone  with  children  regardless  of  household 
income”; 
“Child benefit should be part of taxable income”; and, 
“People with high incomes should be given less child benefit than people with low 
incomes”. 
   14 
4. Results 
 
4.1. Personal/Household Willingness to Pay 
Of the 1,159 respondents who were asked the WTP question, 129 did not give an 
amount (11.1%). There was no significant difference between the two versions in this 
regard (12% versus 10.3%, p>0.36). The majority of respondents to both versions of 
the question responded that they would not be willing to pay any amount of extra 
taxation  to  finance  increases  in  social  welfare  expenditure.  In  Version  1,  where 
respondents were first asked to give “your WTP”, 339 of 507 respondents (66.9%) 
responded that they would not be willing to pay extra taxation to fund increases in 
social welfare provision, while in Version 2, where respondents were asked to give 
“your  household”  WTP,  353  of  523  (67.5%)  of  respondents  responded  that  they 
would  not  be  willing  to  pay  extra  taxation  to  fund  increases  in  social  welfare 
provision. Again, there was no significant difference between the two versions in this 
regard. 
 
The responses to the follow-up question, asking respondents whether their amount 
represented personal or household WTP, are displayed in Table 1. This question was 
restricted to the respondents (a total of 876) who had previously indicated that they 
were married or living as married. 70.3% of respondents who answered the question 
claimed that their bid represented household WTP. Rather surprisingly, the responses 
do not vary greatly between the two different versions of the survey. In Version 1, 
where respondents are asked to give “your WTP”, 68.4% of respondents respond that 
this represents household WTP, whereas in Version 2 where respondents are asked to 
give  “your  household  WTP”,  70.3%  of  respondents  respond  that  this  represents   15 
household  WTP.  This  means  that  27.8%  of  respondents  who  were  asked  to  give 
“household WTP” instead give “personal WTP”.  This is one of the key results of the 
paper. CVM studies that do not resolve this ambiguity will yield imprecise results.  
 
Our  next  step  is  to  examine  the  determinants  of  whether  individuals  respond  as 
individuals or as households in CVM surveys, examining in particular the manner in 
which  their  household  finances  are  structured.  The  respondents  (876)  who  had 
previously stated that they were married or living as married were also asked about 
their income-pooling arrangements. In total 535 respondents answered the question. 
8% of these respondents stated that they held completely separate finances from their 
partner, while 36.6% stated that they held completely integrated finances with their 
partner. Given rather small sub-samples sizes, a binary dummy variable was created 
that simply codes whether respondents held separate or joint accounts; 26.4% of the 
respondents were classified as holding separate accounts, while 73.6% of respondents 
were classified as holding joint accounts.  
 
Table  2  displays  the  marginal  effects  from  two  binary  probit  models,  designed  to 
examine  the  determinants  of  whether  an  individual  states  that  their  bid  is  equal  to 
"household" (=1) or individual (=0). As can be seen, the first model indicates that this is 
strongly affected by age and the presence of children, similar to the previous findings of 
Delaney and O' Toole (2004). Thus, there is some degree of differential item functioning 
that is important to be explained in this literature. The marginal effects from model give 
a strong indication of the source of this difference in interpretation. Including our binary 
measure  of  financial  integration  in  to  the  model,  we  find  that  it  is  a  substantial 
determinant of the decision to give a household bid and once this is included, the effects   16 
of children and age are no longer significant. Interestingly, the negative effect of being 
male on responding with a household becomes more pronounced when one controls for 
household finances. This is similar to the findings of Delaney and O' Toole, where men 
were more likely to respond as individuals than women. The key result, however, from 
this  model  is  that  respondents  interpretation  of  CVM  questions  depends  very 
substantially on the manner in which they structure their household finances. 
8 
 
4.3 Income Pooling and Preferences for Child Benefit 
Models  1-2  displays  the  results  of  ordinary  least  squares  regressions  of  the 
determinants of preferences for (i) social welfare expenditure and (ii) child benefit 
expenditure. Models 3-6 display the results of ordinary least squares regressions of 
the determinants of preferences for three different schemes for making child benefit 
more conditional on income. Most importantly, it can be seen that while males with 
higher incomes are less in favour of government expenditure than females on higher 
incomes, they are substantially more in favour making child benefit progressive in 
income than females. They are also substantially more in favour of making child 
benefit a means-test payment whereby only those on lower incomes would receive 
payment.  This  same  effect  does  not  apply  to  taxing  child  benefit.  Again,  this  is 
consistent with the view that the child benefit is considered to be the wife' s income. 
The tax itself would be a tax on household income rather than specifically deducted 
from the benefit payment. None of the above conclusions are conditional on the use of 
the Ordinary Least Squares model and emerge from several other types of model 
including ordered logit models.  
 
                                                 
8 For reasons of space and exposition, we do not discuss aggregation biases in this final version of the 
paper. See Delaney and O' Toole (2004) for an example of how this issue is crucial for aggregating the 
demand for a public good.    17 
5. Conclusions 
 
There has been renewed interest of late in the use of the open-ended willingness to 
pay  question  as  a  method  of  eliciting  respondents’  preferences  for  non-marketed 
goods (e.g. Ready, Navrud and Dubourg 2001). The use of the question implies a 
serious  caveat  in  many  applications,  namely  whether  the  respondent  models  the 
implied valuation as being a household or an individual valuation. In this paper, it is 
demonstrated that respondents, who are part of a couple, primarily but not exclusively 
model  bids  as  being  a  household  valuation.  There  was  also  a  strong  positive 
correlation between the level of household financial integration and the likelihood that 
a  respondent  models  a  WTP  question  as  being  a  household  decision.  However, 
modelling respondents’ WTP as being household valuations is problematic and may 
lead to an underestimate of WTP for multi-person households. In particular, even 
when respondents are asked the “household WTP”, a substantial proportion interpret 
this as eliciting personal valuation. Explicitly asking respondents to spend from the 
household budget constraint is no guarantee that they will do so, particularly if the 
respondent is not in a financially integrated relationship. The implication for CVM 
practice is that studies that assess WTP should include extra probes to inquire whether 
or not the respondent is giving household WTP. The recent literature on anchoring 
vignettes has stressed the importance of differential item functioning, and the issue we 
raise here could potentially be resolved utilising similar methodologies as employed 
in this literature.  
 
In  addition,  and  similar  to  Lampietti  (1999)  we  find  that  women  and  men  have 
different preferences for household public goods, lending further evidence to the view   18 
that the concept of “household” preferences is problematic. Although women did not 
demonstrate  significantly  different  patterns  of  support  for  general  government 
expenditures, we found significant evidence that income and gender has an effect on 
determining preferences for a proposal to make child benefit a conditional payment on 
income.  It  appears  that  introducing  conditionality  would  weaken  the  bargaining 
position of women in the top income bracket relative to their partners and that for this 
reason, women are more likely to oppose this than men. This is further and novel 
empirical evidence for how the economics of intra-household bargaining determines 
the  structure  of  preferences  for  public  goods,  and  society-wide  allocations. 
Particularly,  it  demonstrates  that  gender  differences  emerge  significantly  for  a 
household public good when the provision of that good alters the intra-household 
entitlement to income between the partners. 
   19 
6. References 
ALVAREZ, M and MCCAFFREY, E., (2000). “Are There Sex Differences in Fiscal 
Political Preferences”. 56 Political Research Quarterly 5. 
BURGOYNE,  C.,  (1995).  “Financial  Organisation  and  decision-making  within 
Western ‘households’”. Journal of Economic Psychology, 16, pp. 421-30. 
 
DELANEY,  L  and  O’TOOLE,  F.,  (2004).  “Eliciting  Household  and  Individual 
Willingness  To  Pay”,  mimeo,  Department  of  Economics,  Trinity  College 
Dublin, June 2004. 
 
DUPONT,  (2004).  “Do  children  matter?  An examination  of gender  differences  in 
environmental valuation" in Ecological Economics 49(3): pp. 273-286. 
 
FONG,  C.,  (2001).  “Social  Preferences,  Self-Interest,  and  the  Demand  for 
Redistribution”, Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 82, pp. 225-46. 
 
HOCHMAN, H.M. and RODGERS, J.D., (1969). "Pareto Optimal Redistribution", 
American Economic Review, 59, pp. 542-557. 
 
HODDINOTT, J., and HADDAD, L., (1995). “Does Female Income Share Influence 
Household Expenditure Patterns?” Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 
Vol. 57 (1), pp. 77-97. 
   20 
LAMPIETTI, J., (1999). “Do Husbands and Wives make the same choices? Evidence 
from Northern Ethiopia”, Economics Letters, Vol. 62, pp. 253-60. 
 
PAHL, J., 1995. “His money, her money: recent research on financial organisation in 
marriage”, Journal of Economic Psychology, Vol. 26(3), pp. 361-76. 
 
PHIPPS, S.A., and BURTON, P.A., (1992). “What’s Mine is Yours? The Influence of 
Male  and  Female  Incomes  on  Patterns  of  Household  Expenditure”, 
Economica, Vol. 65, pp. 599-613. 
 
QUIGGIN,  J.,  (1998).  "Individual  and  Household  Willingness  to  Pay  for  Public 
Goods." American Journal of Agricultural Economics. Vol. 80(1), pp. 58-63. 
 
READY, R.C., NAVRUD, S., and DUBOURG, W.R., (2001). “How Do Respondents 
with Uncertain Willingness to Pay Answer Contingent Valuation Questions?” 
Land Economics, Vol. 77 (3), pp. 315-26. 
 
SCHEVE,  K.,  and  SLAUGHTER,  M.,  (2003).  "Public  Opinion,  International 
Integration, and the Welfare State", mimeo. 
 
SCHULTZ, T., (1990). “Testing the Neoclassical Model of Family Labor Supply and 
Fertility,” Journal of Human Resources, Vol. 25, pp. 599-634. 
 
THOMAS,  D.,  (1990).  “Intra-Household  Resource  Allocation:  An  Inferential 
Approach,” Journal of Human Resources, Vol. 25, pp. 635-64.   21 
Table 1: Personal or Household Willingness to Pay by Version 
   Version   
Response:   Personal First  Household First  Total 
Household  296 (68.4%)  320 (72.2%)  616 (70.3%) 
Personal   137 (31.6%)  123 (27.8%)  260 (29.7%) 
   433  443  876 
Household Financing Structure 




43  8.0  8.0 
Separate Accounts  98  18.3  26.4 
Joint Accounts  154  28.8  55.1 
Joint but other Money 
Separate 
44  8.2  63.3 
Joint Accounts and 
Conduct Together 
196  36.6  100 




Table 2: Determinants of Whether Respondents Answer as Households or 
Individuals 
  dF/dx  dF/dx 
     
Age   0.017***  0.001 
  0.006  0.010 
Age-Squared  0.000  0.000 
  0.000  0.000 
Dependent Children  0.156***  0.037 
  0.036  0.046 
Joint Finances  -  0.184*** 
  -  0.054 
Middle Income  0.017  0.027 
  0.039  0.043 
High Income  -0.131**  -0.020 
  0.065  0.068 
Household Version  0.024  0.061 
  0.035  0.041 
Gender  -.130***  -0.04 
  0.039  0.048 
N  690  395 
Pseudo-R  0.070  0.090 
Notes: Standard errors are given in parenthesis *** indicates significance at the 1% 
level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, * indicates significance at the 10% level. 
The  Base  Category  for  Income  is  Low  Income.  The  Base  Category  for  Household 
Version is Individual Version.    22 
Table 3: Determinants of Preferences for Government  












Age  0.011  0.022*  0.012  -0.013  -0.022  -0.035 
  0.015  0.013  0.021  0.022  0.022  0.022 
Age-Squared  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Dependent Children  0.235**  0.427***  -0.471***  -0.437***  -0.282**  0.513*** 
  0.107  0.091  0.145  0.154  0.157  0.158 
Male  -0.035  -0.068  -0.087  -0.218**  0.143  -0.129 
  0.103  0.087  0.140  0.148  0.151  0.152 
Middle Income  -0.522***  -0.374***  -0.366**  -0.522***  -0.699***  0.523*** 
  0.109  0.092  0.148  0.158  0.161  0.162 
High Income  -0.715***  -0.686***  -0.473  -1.439***  -1.451***  1.176*** 
  0.230  0.195  0.308  0.328  0.334  0.336 
Full-Time Employed  -0.406***  -0.205***  0.284*  0.477  0.314  -0.016 
  0.109  0.093  0.148  0.158  0.161  0.162 
Male*High Income  -0.019  0.580**  0.486  1.472***  1.151***  -1.253*** 
  0.311  0.264  0.420  0.447  0.456  0.458 
Constant  4.998***  4.759***  2.852***  5.164***  5.260***  4.554*** 
  0.302  0.255  0.410  0.433  0.441  0.444 
N  827  827  827  827  827  827 
R-Squared  0.090  0.070  0.040  0.060  0.070  0.050 
Notes: Standard errors are given in parenthesis *** indicates significance at the 1% 
level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, * indicates significance at the 10% level. 
The  Base  Category  for  Income  is  Low  Income.  The  Base  Category  for  Household 
Version is Individual Version.  
 